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Chapter One 
This thesis examines the interwar peace movement of outlawry and its founder Salmon 
Levinson. Many peace movements that emerged in the years following World War I. People 
were desperate for lasting peace after the carnage of the Great War. One movement that is often 
ignored or given only little interest is outlawry. The other popular movements of the time, such 
as the push for the League of Nations and disarmament, generally receive more attention from 
scholars studying peace and the success of movements to prevent war. The example focused on 
when outlawry is considered is the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a treaty that was the result of an 
international attempt to remove the legality of war. This thesis argues that the outlawry 
movement was a complex and realistic peace effort that had the support of not only powerful 
politicians, but also the support of the general public. 
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Salmon Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, created outlawry, with the help of many allies. He 
spent years refining the belief that war could come to an end if war was made illegal and steps 
taken to ensure warmakers were held accountable. He <ltd help to bring about the Kellogg -Briand 
Pact, which was a success for the outlawry proponents, despite its inability to prevent World War 
II. Outlawry was a highly idealistic peace plan, operating under the belief that laws were the 
ultimate power that would put an end to war. However, this thesis seeks to prove that outlawry 
was important to understanding the environment in the interwar years and how the effects of 
World War I created a world ripe for peace movements. This thesis also shows the power that 
one individual can have and how it just takes one idea to change the world. 
This chapter considers the effect of World War One, the League of Nations, the attempts 
at disarmament, and Levinson's views of the other peace movements. The international stage 
was flooded with peace activists following the conclusion of WWI, with many bringing their 
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own concept of how to achieve peace. Some supported the League of Nations, which the Treaty 
of Versailles created as an organization dedicated to the foundation of a lasting peace. This 
chapter will show how the League became an unsatisfying solution for Levinson and many other 
desperate for a peace plan. The inadequacies of the League left the field open for other peace 
activists' plans. The disarmament movement also found a base in the interwar years, with many 
believing the way to peace was by limiting arms internationally. However, this chapter will 
demonstrate the limitations of the disarmament movement and how it struggled to navigate basic 
issues about the clashing interests of various nations. Salmon Levinson will be introduced in this 
chapter. We learn how his disillusion with the League and disarmament led to his introduction of 
outlawry as the strongest peace plan. Indeed, the failures and distrust of the League and 
disarmament provided vital space for outlawry to grow and gain momentum in the race for a 
successful peace movement. 
World War I was unlike anything anyone had ever seen before, creating a new world 
order that could only emerg� from a global conflict. When the war began, it was meant be a "war 
to end war," and people believed that it would be the last battle between nations leading to 
lasting peace. 1 The Great War was launched to right wrongs that were both real and imagined, 
with the belligerents bringing destruction that had been unprecedented and on an unimaginable 
scale.2 The United States began as a neutral nation in 19 14, but it too eventually would be 
brought into the global conflict, with President Woodrow Wilson leading the country into its first 
total war. 3 While the war was fought in Europe, everyone in the United States would be a part of 
1 Robert Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1952), 12. 
2 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 104. 
3 Ferrell, 11. 
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the war effort, whether through building ammunitions, fighting, driving ambulances, or caring 
for wounded after they returned. Philip Kerr, a British politician, recalled in 1 929 the atmosphere 
immediately following the war: "It is what may happen when war breaks out, not the direct 
aggression of others, that most nations worry about and arm against."4 By November 1 1 , 1 9 18,  
the world was weary of war and rejoiced at the peace brought by the Allies, hoping that the 
Armistice would be the start of a peaceful world and the end of global conflicts. 5 At the end of 
WWI, 8 million combatants were dead and roughly 3 .5 percent of the European population had 
died due to the war.6 With the battlefields quieted, the focus of the Allies turned from war to 
peace and how to organize a world that had been seen destruction it never could have imagined. 
Out of the chaos and drive for peace came four important peace issues: The World Court, the 
League of Nations, disarmament, and militarism, all of which would be a focus in the years 
following the Armistice. 7 WWI would have many repercussions that were felt for years to come, 
but one of great importance would be Levinson's introduction to the world stage and his work 
..
. 
for a legal world peace. 
Salmon Levinson is not a name that is widely known. Although he started a peace 
movement whose efforts would result in a multi-national anti-war treaty, Levinson chose to do 
most of his work behind the scenes, letting others promote his ideas. Levinson's grandfather fled 
Germany in the late 1840s to escape the Prussian militarist regime. Levinson's father moved to 
Noblesville, Indiana with his family .8 Salmon came from a prosperous, middle-class family, who 
4 Philip Kerr to Salmon Levinson, 23 May 1929, Box 26, Folder 3, Salmon Levinson Papers 1905- 1998, Special 
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago IL (Hereafter Levinson Papers). 
5 Ferrell, 3. 
6 Hathaway and Shapiro, 104. 
7 Ferrell, 15. 
8 John Stoner, S. 0. Levinson and the Pact of Paris: A Study in the Techniques of Influence (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1942), 1. 
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were the only Jewish members of the Noblesville community.9 His father ran a dry goods store 
and was a source of advice for public officials, including congressmen, who would come to talk 
over speeches and get pointers.10 Salmon Levinson went to the University of Chicago and Yale 
before getting his law degree from Lake Forest College, then he moved to Chicago and worked 
at his uncle's law firm. After facilitating a large settlement in a particular case, Levison became a 
junior partner at his uncle's firm of Moses and Newman, but he and a coworker, Benjamin V. 
Becker, would organize their own firm in the coming years.11 Unknown to him at the time, 
Levinson's journey to become a lawyer would lead him to become an important player in the 
peace movements following WWI and he would be at the center of a forward thinking, legalistic 
anti-war campaign. 
Levinson's work as a young lawyer would help him to build an understanding not just of 
law, but of the innerworkings of people and governmental interactions. In an article, "The Legal 
Status of War," written in 1 9 18, Levinson explained that his experience in law had been, "largely 
in dealing with problems arising from conflicts of interest due to industrial breakdowns and a 
consequent need for reorganization."12 In 1 908 Levinson had helped to reorganize the properties 
controlled by George Westinghouse, as well as having a part in reorganizing the Frisco and the 
Chicago & Eastern Illinois railroads.13 The fees that Levinson earned from work and investments 
in the companies he reorganized would serve as the basis for the fortune he later spent so freely 
in his peace work.14 Levinson did not realize that when he began his law work that it would lead 
9 M.W. Childs, "A Chicago Lawyer's One-Man War Against War," 14 April 1929, Box 29, Folder 11, Levinson 
Papers. 
10 Stoner, 2. 
11 Stoner, 6-7. 
12 Salmon Levinson, "The Legal Status of War," 9 March 1918, Box 29, Folder 9, Levinson Papers. 
13 Childs, "A Chicago Lawyer's," Box 29, Folder 11, Levinson Papers. 
14 Stoner, 8. 
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him to become a peace activist, but all the practice he had as a lawyer would allow him to create 
a strong peace plan. 
While he had spent the first few years of the 1900s reorganizing struggling business 
ventures, Levison had never given much thought to international affairs until he observed, at the 
beginning of WWI, that the war was affecting the US stock market.15 However, once Levison 
was aware of the financial impact of the war, he came to be convinced that international relations 
were not different from industrial relations; in both, one had to convince the parties to act 
rationally and to persuade them not to make a bad situation worse.16 Levinson said his financial 
law background convinced him that "the problem of adjusting large conflicting corporate interest 
is not essentially different as a human problem from that of the adjustment of conflicting national 
interests."17 After Levinson decided to enter the discussion about finding a solution to war, he 
would say in 1922 that he was motivated by "hatred of war and love of peace both as economic 
and moral propositions" but he was not willing to accept just any solution for peace.18 Levinson 
would not be the only person to step into the world of international politics because of W\\11. It 
was a crowded field full of passionate voices supporting their own agenda. Levinson quickly 
found that international relations had a tradition of compromise that he was not willing to accept. 
As Levinson experienced his awakenings to the bitter realities of international conflict 
and the potential of lasting peace, the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson's hope for 
the world, seemed to be failing. It was a complex organization that took months of compromise 
and adjustments to establish as an international organization. There were diplomats from various 
countries who all had the interest of their nation at heart, and from the beginning, there were 
1 5 Ferrell, 31. 
16 Hathaway and Shapiro, 107. 
17 Levinson, "The Legal Status," Box 29, Folder 9, Levinson Papers. 
18 Salmon Levinson to William Borah, 17 /18 July 1922, Box 3, Folder 16, Levinson Papers. 
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qualms about the true neutrality and usefulness of the League. Thomas Knock wrote To End All 
Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order focusing on President Wilson and 
his contribution to the creation of the League of Nations. The president was well known as a 
major designer of the League of Nations, his Fourteen-Point plan for peace being a famous 
stepping-stone to the League's Covenant. While Knock recognizes the failings of the League, he 
shows the strategies and plans that were behind the foundation of the League and how they 
became distorted in the attempt to satisfy all world players and parties involved in negotiations. 
In the beginning, Wilson came up with a four-point program for the League: 1 )  no nation shall 
ever again be permitted to acquire an inch of land by conquest, 2) recognition of the reality of 
equal rights between small nations and great, 3) munitions of war had to be manufactured 
entirely by the nations and not private enterprise, and 4) necessity of an association of nations, 
bound together for the protection of each, so that any nation breaking this bond would be bring 
war and punishment upon itself. 19  In laying out what Wilson's  original focus points for the 
League Knock demonstrates how much the plan changed in th� negotiations and how that 
burdened the League's ability to function as a peacekeeping organization. In Wilson's mind, the 
League would make arbitration compulsory and decisions binding; it would hold out absolute 
guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence while also supporting self-
determination; and disarmament would be a serious priority that was integral to the success of 
the whole system.20 
Wilson had high hopes for what the League could accomplish. But, Knock shows why 
the League proved unable to follow through on so many of the original goals in its Covenant. In 
19 Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 35. 
20 Knock, 153. 
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its design "The Covenant was both definite enough to guarantee peace and elastic enough to 
provide for readjustment, its powers subject to 'those who exercise it and in accordance with the 
changing circumstances of the time,'" but it was also doomed to fail without strong enough 
support or power, concludes Knock.21  In his study, Knock focuses primarily on President Wilson 
and how his life and political career lead to, and maybe hindered, the formation of the League of 
Nations and its ensuing failure to stop continued war. 
The League of Nations, when created in 1 920 at the Paris Peace Conference, was a 
controversial organization that found allies and enemies in all places. People often took issue 
with the Covenant and felt that the League failed in its ultimate goals to put an end to war and 
serve as a peacekeeping organization. A 1 919 artic le, "Conflicting Interests at the Peace 
Conference," written by American journalist J.C. Walsh, argues "The Peace Conference is 
popularly supposed to be engaged in so remaking the world that in future there will be nothing to 
go to war about" which is indicative of the hope the world had at the thought of a peace 
agreement that the world powers 'Yere negotiating.22 However, despite the hope for a lasting 
peace, the secrecy that was surrounding the peace conference made the populations watching 
nervous. Many of the governments which sent delegations to the conference were not 
forthcoming as negotiations were taking place. Walsh writes about the various possibilities for 
such secrecy-England, in particular, eager to extend its imperial system, France and Italy 
seeking to gain new territory, Greece trying to restore the Byzantine Empire, Rumania seeking to 
become a secondary power, and even the Serbs and Croats already in a quasi-conflict with 
Italy .23 Walsh conveys both the hope and distrust the world population had for the peace 
211Cnock, 233-234. 
22 J.C. Walsh, "Conflicting Interests at the Peace Conference," America 20, no. 18 (2/8/1919): 438. 
23 Walsh, 440. 
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conference and how the seeds of doubt were in place before the League of Nations even took full 
form. An organization that came to being with mixed reactions would already have to fight to 
prove its worth, and the League had to work against many handicaps to fulfill any of the 
peacekeeping goals set forth in the Covenant. 
Even years after the creation of the League of Nations, the world was still waiting for the 
organization to follow through on some of the promises that had been made at its founding. 
League designers had planned for it to hold a powerful and respected position in international 
relations as the peacekeeper that kept the world from war. Swiss diplomat Max Habicht gave a 
speech in 1939 called "Successes and Failures of the League of Nations" in which he provided 
his immediate insights on the League of Nations up to that point. Two years after its inception, 
Habicht explained, the League created the World Court at The Hauge, consisting of fifteen 
permanent judges appointed to settle legal disputes between nation-states, open to any sovereign 
state wishing to use it.24 Habicht recognized, however, that the biggest danger did not come from 
conflipts over the rights and obligations of states, but instead from disputes over the change of 
rights and obligations, or the changing status quo of states.25 The League did not have the power 
and backing to follow through on the attempts made to settle disputes, or in some cases, the 
League did not act fast enough to be able to come to a settlement. League members realized that 
the League could only be helpful in "settling disputes and organizing international cooperation 
whenever the immediate interests of all partners are parallel" and considering they seldom were 
parallel, the League was left without much success.26 Habicht acknowledged some League 
successes, such as keeping an eye on the mandatory territories created by the League Covenant. 
24 Max Habicht, "Successes and Failures of the League of Nations," Vital Speeches of the Day 5, no. 22 (9/1/1939): 
703. 
25 Habicht, 703. 
26 Habicht, 704. 
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He also cited some failures, such as the League's inability to protect some 40 minorities created 
through peace treaties and its failure at achieving military or economic disarmament.27 Sharp 
debate then ensued about the League. Some did not agree with the League and the Covenant that 
created it, and others believed that it was too strong or that it was not strong enough. Either way, 
the League hardly put an end to peace movements following WWI, instead its presence 
encouraged people like Levinson to push for his own ideas in the wake of the League's 
controversy . 
Another aspect that is important to understanding the League of Nations and its 
connection to peace movements is to examine how emerging internationalism affected the 
League's ability to function across national lines and connect countries with different agendas. 
Historian Mark Mazower's study, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, traces the 
progression of internationalism from before the first world war all the way to the more modem 
creation of the United Nations. "Internationalism, in its modem sense as a movement of 
cooperation among nations and their peoples, was moving from the realm of marginal ideas into 
the mainstream," wrote Mazower, referencing the international work that became prominent as 
the League of Nations was founded.28 The influence of the ideology of internationalism can best 
be seen in the attempts to establish a World Court in cooperation with the League of Nations. 
American diplomat Elihu Root, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912,  believed that it was not 
possible to have legislation or an international police force control people, but instead that an 
international court was the best way to ensure peace. 29 Many of the people who took part in 
creating the League of Nations believed peace was rooted in international law creation and the 
27 Habicht, 703. 
28 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012): 23. 
29 Mazower, 91. 
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establishment of a strong international court that would interpret and lay down the law.  However, 
those same people were discouraged when in the League Covenant, the court had practically 
disappeared and international law was hardly mentioned.30 While Mazower's focus is on 
internationalism, specifically the world court, he also outlines other weaknesses in the structure 
of the League of Nations. The assembly looked like a legislature, but had no lawmaking 
capabilities; the secretariat was a w eak coordinating body with no powers independent of the 
League's members; and the League had no standing forces or any machinery for enforcing peace 
past the commitment of its members to submit disputes to arbitration.3 1  Mazower introduces 
another way to study the League of Nations by using internationalism to understand the structure 
of the League and how it led to disputes, making way for people like Levinson to step in with 
their own, powerful peace plans. 
Levinson followed the proceedings at the Paris Peace Conference with interest; he was 
already an active member of international peace movements, and he waited with the rest of the 
world to see what would come of the global peace conference. However, from the start, Levinson 
had concerns about peace negotiations. In 1 9 18, he wrote "I  am so afraid that the Versailles 
conference will end, so far as the League of Nations is concerned, in some 20th century rhetoric, 
which may be an improvement upon the diction used in the 1 9th century but when the test comes 
there will be a laugh on the "radicals" again."32 Levinson did express early hope for the League, 
concluding in 191 9, "the plan brought home by the President is the best scheme for a League of 
Nations that has been tendered to the World," a sentiment echoed by many peace activists  who 
saw Wilson's Fourteen Points as a valid peace plan.33 However, Levinson's distrust of 
30 Mazower, 138. 
31 Mazower, 136. 
32 Salmon Levinson to John Dewey, 28 December 1918, Box 15, Folder 23, Levinson Papers. 
33 Salmon Levinson to Philander Knox, 21 February 1919, Box 26, Folder 9, Levinson Papers. 
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diplomacy and politicians combined with his strong faith in the legal processes soon led him to 
discount the League because of its lack of legal language or foundation .34 In June of 1919, 
Levinson wrote, "If a real plan to abolish and outlaw war were put to Clemenceau, Orland and 
Makino, it would get no votes from these imperialists and militarists" making it clear that he felt 
that the League had not met his expectations and he put some of the blame on the men who made 
it .35 He viewed the Le ague Covenant as an "alliance plus ... a constitution without power and a 
system without machinery" and that de spite all of the work put into the League, too much time 
had been spent pleasing the different national powers.36 Levinson was hardly alone in opposing 
US membership in the League-many congressional leaders shared his distrust of the 
organization-so the United States would not become a member of the League of Nations. 
Advocates of the League would work to counteract the objections to the League, but 
problems were so varied that they could never convince enough people to change position. 
Levinson would stand by his position against the League, writing in 1923 that even if affirmative 
jurisdiction over justiciable disputes were added to the makeup of th�_ court created by the 
League, that there would still be two major issues with the League. Levinson wrote that a code 
needed to be created. Without such a code, the Court would remain arbitral and the nations 
would distrust it, as there would be no limiting constitutional principles. He also insisted that the 
code would have to outlaw war in order to be successful.37 He recognized the danger of the 
League as it existed, writing in 1924, that, 
. . .  to control the world by force with the real power in the hands of three or four 
nations coupled with a potential threat to United States that unless she becomes 
34 Stoner, 101. 
35 Salmon Levinson to Philander Knox, 19 June 1919, Box 26, Folder 9, Levinson Papers. 
36 Stoner, 49. 
37 Salmon Levinson to William Borah, 17 March 1923, Box 4, Folder 1, Levinson Papers. 
13 
member of  League and submits to councils jurisdiction we may find ourselves in 
war with all League nations automatically against us. 38 
All while working and refining his own peace plan, Levinson felt the pressure of the League 
supporters, who were working as hard as he to secure backing for their organization . In a letter 
he received in 1923 from William Hard, one of his allies, Hard lamented, "the drive to get us into 
the League is at this very moment extremely vigorous and extremely dangerous and is taking 
every form and using every argument necessary in order to trick us."39 Levinson's peace plan 
then would help them to fight the League and its malicious influence. However, it was not just 
the movement to get the United States into the League of Nations that pressured Levinson as he 
tried to promote his own peace plan .  The disarmament movement had found some support in the 
League's Covenant, and it used its public support to push an agenda of  peace through decreasing 
armaments. 
Part of the League of  Nations Covenant dealt with disarmament . An article existed in the 
Covenant promoting in vague terms dis�ament, but not laying out an idea as to the how and 
when. Historian Andrew Webster's article ""Absolutely Irresponsible Amateurs": The 
Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1921-1924," examines the League of Nations 
committee designated to temporarily deal with the issue of disarmament and its implementation.  
Disarmament, Webster asserts, "touched at the very heart of every interwar debate over 
international and national security" making it a very important goal for the League of  Nations to 
pursue.40 The Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments was created in 192 1 after 
discussions at the first League Assembly revealed that had been little to no progress at any 
38 Salmon Levinson to William Hard, 3 October 1924, Box 20, Folder 15, Levinson Papers. 
39 William Hard to Salmon Levinson, 3 June 1923, Box 20, Folder 15, Levinson Papers. 
40 Andrew Webster, "''Absolutely Irresponsible Amateurs": The Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 
1921-1924," Australian Journal of Politics and History 54, no. 3 (2008): 373. 
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disarmament goals.41 The TMCA was supposed to be made up of private citizens, unrestrained 
by formal instructions from governments, and therefore it could set forth ideas that could be too 
problematic politically if presented from official representatives.42 However, as Webster points 
out, there were immediate problems with the commission from the beginning, stemming from 
the membership. The TMCA was to include : six people competent in political, social and 
economic matters; four economic experts from the League's Economic and Financial 
Commissions; and six experts from the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Organization, consisting of three employers' representatives and three workers' 
representatives.43 It proved impossible to get nations to agree on non-political members being 
appointed, and the French and British even insisted that members from the military commission 
on disarmament be included in the TMCA, tying it to the political effort for disarmament.44 
Because of the various missteps and outside intervention, the TMCA was unable to achieve 
much in terms of disarmament . The focus of the commission was also hampered by the absence 
of the Unitee States, Germany, and Russia from the League . Plus, many members were 
concerned with whether Germany has disarmed as the Treaty of Versailles demanded.45 With so 
much outside influence and very limited power, the TMCA did the best that it could to 
encourage disarmament and come up with plans that the differing governments might accept. 
Webster explores the failures of  the disarmament movement, and specifically the group within 
the League that was tasked with the issue and how the League's influence over the commission 
left it with little room to succeed. 
41 Webster, TMCA, 374. 
42 Webster, TMCA, 373.  
4 3  Webster, TMCA, 375. 
44 Webster, TMCA, 375. 
45 Webster, TMCA, 377. 
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Disarmament was not a complete failure, but many peace activists felt that the world was 
not ready for disarmament and that there were many diplomatic and international issues that 
halted the progress of lowering armaments. So disappointing was the League, the organization 
was permanently tainted, even for historians. Andrew Webster notes few studies provide 
comprehensive examinations of the League since most scholars dismiss it for its shortcomings.46 
Scholarly literature on the interwar efforts for international disarmament has focused on the 
inevitable failure of the movement due to unchecked nationalism of the League's members.47 
During the early 1920s, the disarmament initiative by the League was handled by three bodies: 
the all -military Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments established 1920, the primarily 
civilian TMCA established 192 1, and the Disarmament Section of the League's Secretariat.48 
Inspired by the work of these various commissions, some people saw disarmament as a way to 
create a more stable international state system with peaceful interactions encouraging an 
international community, but that belief in disarmament was quickly dashed by the commissions 
inability to accomplish anything of importance. 
Despite the many committees dedicated disarmament, it was impossible to keep national 
interests out of the work which created constant pressure for those working towards 
disarmament. One of the persistent issues surrounding arms limitations was that some people 
saw disarmament as a tool to increase their own national security through collaboration over 
disarmament reducing threats.49 In the second Assembly of the League, one of the members said: 
"I wonder whether it is not the very armaments of nations which create conflicts. In any case 
46 Andrew Webster, "The League of Nations, Disarmament and Internationalism," in Internationalisms: A 
Twentieth-Century History, ed. Glenda Sluga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 143. 
47 Webster, "The League ofNations," 142. 
48 Webster, "The League ofNat ions," 152. 
49 Webster, "The League ofNat ions," 145. 
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they create distrust, and perpetuate the atmosphere of mutual fear among nations, which is the 
most profound and fruitful cause of international crises."50 This sentiment seems to express well 
the League's na'ive desire to achieve disarmament regardless of the individual desires of various 
nations. There were various ways the League sought to progress in the disarmament movement. 
Their initiatives included: controlling the international arms traffic, regulating private 
manufacture of armaments, mandating open publication data on national armaments, imposing 
caps on national budgetary expenditure on defense, and prohibiting the use of poison gas in 
wartime.51 One successful initiative was to provide open data on national armaments. The 
Disarmament Section of the Secretariat prepared an annual Armaments Yearbook, compiled from 
open sources, that described the strength and equipment of the armed forces of more than 60 
countries, along with the size of their defense budgets and their industrial production in materials 
of military use. 52 In his contribution to the book, Webster recognizes that disarmament operated 
internationally, and it did not fail or succeed in a vacuum. 
As activists watched the League of Nations stumble, many found themselves allying with 
the various peace movements emerging at the time as alternatives, such as the disarmament or 
outlawry movements. While Levinson was always focused on his plan to outlaw war, he did not 
work without appreciation of or contact with the disarmament movement. Like supporters of the 
movement to disarm, Levinson saw the advantages to a world with fewer armaments; he just 
believed that disarmament had to be folded in with outlawry: it could not stand alone. WWI had 
disrupted the planned meeting the Third Hague Conference, now key figures pushed for the 
conference to be called in 1920 in order to create and codify international law. Among other 
50 Webster, "The League ofNations," 141. 
51 Webster, "The League ofNations," 154-155. 
52 Webster, "The League ofNations," 157. 
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reforms, proponents of a meeting wanted the conference to touch on disarmament. Similar to the 
League's Covenant, supporters of disarmament wanted laws that mandated "national armaments 
shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and with the necessities of 
international requirements."53 However, people like Levinson realized that disarmament would 
be impossible while war was still prominent in the structure of how nations interacted. 
Levinson hoped that eventually the world would be able to tum to disarmament and come 
to a point where international relations were strong enough to rule without the aid of armaments. 
In a letter Levinson received in 1929, it read "if war is not outlawed, each side must and will ask 
for those armaments which it thinks will give it victory when the war comes."54 This letter 
reflected his beliefs as well that more peace work had to take place before disarmament could be 
implemented. Throughout Levinson's work as a peace activist, he stood by the belief that 
disarmament would have to come after the efforts to outlaw war and create an international code. 
In a speech promoting outlawry in 1924, Levinson said "the inherent difficulty of procuring 
disarmament is the virtual impossibility of getting a general agreement among nations so long as 
the war system is the lawful and authoritative method of settling disputes."55 He recognized the 
importance of disarmament, but believed it would be difficult to get the powerful nations of the 
world to agree to lowering armaments while war remained an integral part of the global system. 
Philip Kerr wrote in a letter in 1929 that for the outlawing of war to work effectively it had to be 
"coupled with a reduction of armaments to the level at which they cease to threaten the existence 
of neighbors."56 Levinson never forgot how important disarmament was in combination to his 
goal of outlawry. In 1924, he declared that "Disarmament is the crying need of the world, but 
53 Salmon Levinson, untitled writing about Third Hague Conference, n.d. Box 29, Folder 6, Levinson Papers. 
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disarmament cannot effectively take place until we smash the war system."57 From the moment 
that he conceived of his plan for peace, Levinson felt that outlawry had to be the absolute focus 
of the drive for a permanent peace, even as he recognized the importance of other movements 
like disarmament. 
57 Levinson, Outlawry of War analysis, 11 January 1924, Box 29, Folder 7, Levinson Papers. 
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Chapter Two 
This chapter examines Levinson's outlawry plan and the different aspects that comprise 
outlawry. He spent years revising his plan and making it as clear as possible. This chapter then 
examines the evolution of what outlawry grew to be in Levinson's eyes. It examines the term 
outlawry itself, and how Levinson came to use and define his movement. The chapter also 
explains the three aspects of outlawry in the legality of war, the definition of war, and the 
establishment of an international court and code. The plan of outlawry was complex as there 
were many different parts that Levinson was constantly reworking to make clearer and prevent 
his points from being misapplied or misused. This chapter seeks to explain his plan and 
differentiate it from the movements supporting the League of Nations and disarmament as 
explained in the first chapter. Chapter Two also shows the boundless work Levinson put into his 
peace plan to make it the most comprehensive and intelligent proposal that was circulating in the 
years following World War I. 
Salmon Le':'._inson was late coming onto the scene of international politics. Indeed, he had 
not always been concerned with the matters of other countries. However, in the wake of postwar 
chaos, he quickly developed a program that focused on laws and the legality of war which he 
would refine in his years working toward peace. His plan was different than the other plans 
emerging at the same time--disarmament proposals, the League of Nations, or other variations­
as Levinson's did not assume the legality of war as the existing plans did and he did not work 
under the premise that war was legitimate. 58 Levinson saw his plan as separate from the League 
because it was not based on the power of alliances or qualities of force, but instead was to be a 
peaceful organization of civilized nations ruled by law and a comprehensive code, both of which 
58 Hathaway and Shapiro, 109-110. 
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would be administered by a world court. 59 As he outlined it, Levinson' s outlawry plan included: 
a general treaty with civilized nations to abolish war by making it a criminal offense; 
establishing a code of international law based on equality of nations and justice; and an 
international court with independence and affirmative jurisdiction. 60 An article in 1 929 considers 
the term "outlawry," which Levinson coined to promote his peace plan. "The term "outlawry" is 
just the right one-it was a piece of profound and shrewd insight to clothe the idea in a term so 
precise and yet so picturesque," read the article.61 Levinson would repeatedly explain his plan 
and why it was the strongest way to peace, but it was the introduction of the term "outlawry" 
itself that would allow Levinson to come to the world stage as a major player in the peace game. 
Levinson outlined how to achieve peace, but he realized that he would be fighting an 
uphill battle to gain the support he needed for outlawry. In 1921 he told his friend William Hard 
that he had come to the conclusion "it is impossible to get governments as at present constituted 
to take any interest in the outlawry of war" because he knew that many governments were 
concerned with only what would benefit them the most following WWI.62 It was Levinson's 
strong commitment, and belief, that outlawry was the right way to achieve peace that kept him 
going, even if he felt that he did not have the support of governments. In a letter to Senator 
William E. Borah (R-ID), a citizen from Kansas wrote, "all who are really interested in 
civilization agree, and have long agreed, that war is the most stupendous wrong that the human 
race has devised, and yet they continue to approve and employ it."63 Feelings such as those 
expressed in the letter to Borah were at the center ofLevinson's movement, as he wondered at 
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how war was able to survive into the modern world. According to his close friend Unitarian 
minister and peace activist John Haynes Holmes, Levinson once said that "war exists 
pragmatically as a means of settling disputes between nations, and persists in spite of all its 
destructive horrors, because it is the only existing means of settling such disputes" and war as a 
solution to conflicts was what Levinson wanted to banish.64 It would be important for Levinson's 
goal of outlawing war for the world to see that problem with the legality of war, and how 
changing laws would be the most effective way to avoid another war. 
Levinson discovered, in his years working toward outlawry, that many people did not 
look at war as legal or illegal: they simply saw it as something that was bad and should be 
regulated so there would not be a repeat of WWI. In 1921, he wrote, "Civilization has been 
marked in its upward trend out of savagery into its present condition by the evolution of law and 
courts to supplant methods of violence and force."65 As society modernized, Levinson 
concluded, it turned to courts and law as the solution for violence. "Civilization has outlawed 
every form of violence for the settlement of human disputes except only wars between nations," 
he explained. 66 In these two parallel comments on civilization and how it handles violence, 
Levinson explained that citizens could move past war, and, it him, it was a wonder that somehow 
war between nations had escaped the use of laws to rid the world of violence. Levinson 
recognized that one of the ways that war has been able to survive was due to its integration into 
the very makeup of society, making it difficult-but not impossible-to do away with 
international war. "War is an institution. An institution is a custom not contrary to law 
established over long periods among peoples and races," he wrote in 1921, explaining that 
64 John Haynes Holmes, Memo, n.d. Box 68, Folder 4, Levinson Papers. 
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although war had a long history, it was not immune to the new power that he felt law was 
achieving in the twentieth century.67 Levinson questioned how, especially after WWI, anyone 
would not want to outlaw war. In his pamphlet introducing Outlawry to the American public, he 
wrote, 
Whatever values wars may have had in the past, these last years have shown 
modem war to be so terrible an instrument, so far reaching in its destruction and 
the results of that destruction, that its use in our closely interdependent present -
day civilization jeopardizes the very life of that civilization.68 
World War I convinced Levinson that international war should not be able to exist legally, 
because it was from the law that he believed that war drew its strength. "War, instead of being 
allowed to remain legal, should be declared illegal. War instead of being legally honorable, 
should be declared legally criminal," explained Levinson of the ideas at the very center of his 
outlawry vision.69 It was in the legality of war that Levinson thought the first attacks against the 
war system needed to take place, and he would spend years advocating for laws ag_ainst war. 
As a lawyer, it follows that Levinson would become most concerned with the legality of 
war and how war operated as a system under the guise of international law. In an article written 
in 1918 called "The Legal Status of War," Levinson asserted, "In one case as the other, we want 
not laws of war, but laws against war, just as we have laws against murder, not laws of 
murder."70 Here Levinson makes clear his basic approach to making laws concerning war. He 
truly believed that part of the danger that war held was that it appeared a perfectly legitimate 
solution to problems under the law. In a conversation with Lord Cecil of Great Britain, Levinson 
67 Salmon Levinson, Doctrine of the Outlawry of War, 1921, Box 29, Folder 10, Levinson Papers. 
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said, "so long as war remains a lawful institution and the available right for settlement of 
disputes real, fancied or imperialistic, so long will war surely break out in the world."71 This 
view that war would persist while it remained legal would be Levinson's constant argument as 
he tried to convert people to the premise that outlawry was the best peace option available. In a 
memo he produced about the principles of outlawry, Levinson wrote "war will continue to 
dominate and control international relations unless .. .it is deinstitutionalized and de-legalized by 
a new basic international law of peace. "72 Levinson had believed, along with much of the world, 
that the ending of WWI would also be the end of global wars and the destruction they wrought. 
However, he watched as the League failed to live up to its promises of peace, and how other 
peace movements like disarmament were unable to gain the traction they would need to succeed 
in securing peace. "Has the crusading promise made to our boys, dead, wounded and 
unwounded, been made to the ear, only to be broke to the hope?" he wondered, echoing the 
sentiments of many people disappointed by the peace proceedings following WWI.73 In 1923, 
Senator Borah wrote, "The world has lately passed th{_ough a baptism of blood and practically all 
the troubles now with us are the result of that war. "74 These such sentiments would create a space 
for Levinson to disseminate his outlawry plans. Levinson would bring to the world's attention 
the legality of war and would spent years convincing the population that the way to peace was 
through the law as it offered the only absolute solution. 
An important aspect of Levinson's outlawry work was how he understood war and how 
he saw the term used or referenced in different nations. His theory, that was at the foundation of 
outlawry, was: war as an institution for settling controversies should be declared by the nations 
71 Transcript of conversation with Salmon Levinson and Lord Cecil, n.d. Box 29, Folder 11, Levinson Papers. 
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of the world to be illegal, and that any territorial changes resulting from war would have no legal 
value.75 Levinson, in his definition of outlawry, was always hesitant to define the different types 
of law and explain why some were different or may be more accepted than others. He did write, 
A war between nations is, and always has been perfectly legitimate . . .  This is not 
true of a war within a nation, a war of liberation, a revolutionary war; for this is 
high treason, whereas a war of aggression and conquest remains immune from 
legal attack. 76 
Levinson wrote in a letter to Philip Kerr in 1929 that the phrase "defensive wars" was "an old, 
subtle, mischievous, outworn, but in a sense typical, international term," all of which reflected 
his dislike of attempts made to distinguish between different types of war. 77 He also took issue 
with those who would constantly argue that war was inherently tied to the right of self-defense, 
and that to go on the offensive against attack came under the same right as defending one's 
nation. In his memo outlining outlawry, Levinson retorted, "The inherent right of self-defense 
should not be confused w:ith the subtle and manipulated distinction between an offensive and a 
defensive war."78 The distinction between a defensive war, offensive war, and self-defense 
would be a source of consistent criticism brought against Levinson's outlawry. Thus, Levinson 
frequently made this case. For instance, in a talk about outlawry in 1924, Levinson reiterated, 
"The right of self-defense by a nation, does not constitute war any more than the individual right 
of self-defense constitutes murder."79 In another instance where Levinson was writing about the 
supposed differences between wars, he explained, "a man defending himself against an attack is 
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not a duelist and a nation defending itself from attack or invasion would not be doing an act of 
war," here again referencing claims that outlawry prohibited self-defense. 80 There were certain 
aspects of outlawry that Levinson had to constantly defend or reinterpret so people understood 
his aim of harnessing the law to delegitimize war as a whole. 
Levinson created a plan for outlawry that he felt could answer all of the concerns and 
qualms that might be raised, while also setting up a system that could develop with changing 
times, with a focus on a court of peace. He wrote in a pamphlet about outlawry that, "war has 
been and still is a sacred institution used by nations as a court, a cruel, destructive court," but it 
was the idea that war acted as a sort of international court that Levinson found troubling.81 When 
crafting outlawry, Levinson split his idea into three important points: Outlawry speci fically, an 
international code, and a global court.82 Writing to Borah in 1922, Levinson claimed, "our 
proposition is one to cover merely the inevitable disputes that, so long as human nature is as it is, 
will arise among the nations and must get settled somehow, either by war or by law," explaining 
,_ 
the necessity of the court. 83 Levinson also wrote that the outlawry proposal included the 
"application of the system of comprehensive laws and a real court to the field of international 
controversies," and that it would operate under the assumption of peace, not war.84 He 
understood that while he did not want to specify the different between aggressive and defensive 
war, he could not stop others from trying to make the distinction. In terms of enforcement, 
Levinson wrote in 1923 that the "international court might be given summary jurisdiction to hear 
and decide whether a given attack by one nation on another is justified or provoked," which 
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would satisfy those who felt there had to be support against attack. 85 He believed in the power of 
the court, but knew that it was only after war was outlawed that "a real court can be erected with 
judicial power over the legitimate law suits of the nations and their grievances and disputes," and 
that it was the two points of his program combined that would lead to a lasting peace.86 Levinson 
put most of his effort and work into refining outlawry and firmly establishing his points for the 
program, such as the international court. 
Levinson knew that creating an international court would be no small task; he would have 
to compete with the interests of powerful countries and leaders who felt that they knew what was 
best for the world. In 192 1 he wrote that the use of force of arms to settle disputes between 
nations was largely due to the lack of courts and laws in the international field. 87 Levinson was 
constantly working to make the world court the best that it could be, admitting in 1928 that "the 
effort should be made to improve the instruments of arbitration and judicial procedure," all in the 
attempt to replace war entirely.88 The very heart of the organization of the world court, Levinson 
believed, should be based off on the Supreme Court of the United States, specifically in the way 
it held jurisdiction over disputes between states without the use of force. 89 In explaining this 
idea, he wrote that the Supreme Court "in decrees and judgments against States is supposed to 
have no power and has never exercised any power to enforce them," yet the States carried out the 
decisions in over forty cases without any force needed.90 Just as the states do in the United 
States, Levinson's plan counted on "all nations shall agree to abide and be bound by and in good 
faith to carry out the orders, decrees and decisions of such Court" and the cooperation between 
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nations allowing the court to function well.91 Levinson harrowed elements of his plan from 
working courts, such as the US Supreme Court, and applied them to the international court he 
was building in order to create a high -functioning judicial system. 
In describing the court that would accompany outlawry, Levinson laid out specifics of 
how the court should be run and operate effectively as a global institution. While the court would 
be closely modeled on the US Supreme Court and much of its ability depends on the promise of 
nations, Levinson also thought it should have plenary power to enforce judgements against the 
criminal violators of the international code.92 Regarding other aspects of how the court would 
function, Levinson wrote that "the court should sit in the hemisphere of the contending nations; 
and if the disputants live in opposite hemispheres, then in the hemisphere of the defendant 
nation."93 He also proposed that the corresponding code, which would help lay out the laws and 
precedents of the court, be amended and brought to date every five years so that new points 
could be covered or added to the international code.94 As Levinson's main motivator for getting 
involved in international politics was his work at a lawyer and the issue of war's legality,_ the 
idea of the global court as an important factor to outlawry cannot be dismissed. 
Another important facet to the outlawry plan that Levinson was questioned about on 
multiple occasions was how force and armaments should be considered in outlawry. While 
Levinson often changed his mind on the matter of force, in 1923 he wrote, "any scheme by 
which peace is to be procured by force, whether it is called balance of power, preponderance of 
power, defensive alliance, or any other name, is merely perpetuating the vicious cycle of war," 
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making it  clear that by that time, he was firmly against using force to secure peace.95 In order to 
cope with the existence of armaments in the world, outlawry called for "a safeguard of sworn 
statements of armaments, military and naval, structural and chemical, to be made at least once a 
year by each nation," so that way no one nation could build up on armaments and threaten the 
international state of peace.96 In Levinson's plan for outlawry, he took a note from the League 
Covenant, writing that it was necessary for "national armaments to be reduced to the lowest point 
consistent with domestic safety."97 In 1923, Levinson wrote, "the peace of the world must be 
worked out as between nations in terms of law, equality and j ustice, and not in terms of force."98 
It was incredibly important to Levinson that it was not force or armaments that ruled the 
international stage, but instead that a system of law and order was the ultimate decider in global 
conflicts. 
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Chapter Three 
This chapter covers Levinson's allies and how he preferred to work through other people 
committed to outlawry, as he wanted to stay out of the international spotlight and work behind 
the scenes. The focus of the chapter is on Levinson's close partnership with both Senator 
Philander C. Knox and Senator William E.  Borah. It also considers his faith in the public and his 
belief that outlawry would succeed because of its popular support. Levinson spent a lot of time 
writing letters to his allies and asking for help refining outlawry, as well as gaining their public 
support. In his work with Senator Knox and Senator Borah, Levinson was looking for allies in 
the Senate, men who could introduce his plan in a governmental setting and campaign for 
outlawry. This chapter also deals heavily with Levinson's absolute faith that the general 
population of the world did not want war and would support his movement to make it illegal. He 
believed that the way to delegitimize war was to show people that they had the power to 
renounce war and force their governments to outlaw war. Chapter Three introduces Levinson's 
desire to build outlawry out of �?operation with powerful men and the belief that in the end, 
outlawry would be a people's movement. 
Levinson did not create the plan for outlawry on his own. He cultivated relationships with 
powerful men so he could combine their intelligence to build the most comprehensive peace plan 
as possible. After he became interested in the state of international affairs following World War 
I, Levinson had the feeling that he needed to speak with Senator Knox. 99 Senator Philander C. 
Knox was Levinson's first ally in his crusade to outlaw war, and was incredibly important 
because together they created the foundation of outlawry that Levinson would build on in his 
years as a peace activist. Senator Knox was a senator from Pennsylvania, and had served as the 
99 William Hard, transcript of a radio address, 23 March 1925, Box 20, Folder 15, Levinson Papers. 
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attorney general and Secretary o f  State in two different presidential cabinets. 100 Under President 
Theodore Roosevelt he worked for the prosecution of the anti -trust law and created a turning 
point in American financing and corporation policy. 101 Knox specialize in corporate law and was 
once described as "the law on two legs," along with another person saying it was difficult to 
think of Knox as anything but a lawyer. 102 It may have been their shared work in law, 
specifically corporate and finance law, that originally brought Levinson and Knox together to 
work on outlawry. Knox was also an intellectual leader of a group which first called attention to 
the defects of the League covenant and voiced resistance to changes that would be brought to the 
United States by joining the League. 103 In Knox, Levinson found not only an ally who 
understood the importance and power of the law, but who was also openly against the League. 
Levinson had found someone who could help to create a plan to oppose the League and fight 
against those that would trick the United States to join an empty organization. 
Levinson was excited when he found that Knox had similar sentiments about the 
pro\eedings in Europe, especially those at the Paris Peace Conference. Senator Knox made a 
speech in 19 19, which was the first public reference to outlawry made by governmental official, 
and his speech also featured an attack on the Covenant of the League ofNations.104 The first 
draft treaty for outlawry would come from the conversations between Knox and Levinson, as the 
two men reshaped and refined their individual ideas about the legality of war.105 It was with the 
help of Knox that Levinson would come to the belief that outlawry could be possible without the 
use of force. Knox looked at records of arbitration and court awards, finding that no countries 
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refused to carry out the judicial decrees, leading him to the belief that outlawry did not need 
police force to function.106 Levinson and Knox worked on their plan for outlawry, giving it to 
people such as Senator Borah to read, hoping for feedback or support on the proposition. After 
reading the plan, Borah had said to Knox "I consider this plan admirable and if you will offer it I 
will support it with all the power I have," and to get the support of Borah was not a small task for 
the two men.107 Levinson worked closely with Senator Knox until his death in 1921, at which 
time he was forced to look for a new spokesperson in the Senate who could help him introduce 
outlawry.108 Senator Knox played an important role in helping Levinson craft the very 
foundation of outlawry, and was vital to the beginning of the movement and all that it developed 
into. 
Levinson preferred not to be on the mainstage; he instead liked to have his allies speak 
publicly in support of outlawry. Therefore, after the death sudden of Senator Knox, Levinson 
knew that he needed new support in the Senate, so he turned much of his attention to Senator 
Borah of Idaho. Senator Borah was never president-not for lack of trying-but he remained a 
mighty figure in national and international affairs, serving as outspoken member of the senate.109 
Borah was a relentless foe of the League of Nations and the World Court, never giving in to 
compromise. 1 10 He rejected the Versailles Treaty when it came to the United States and fought 
against League supporters to keep the US out of the organization. 1 1 1  Borah challenged League 
advocates to come into the open and lay all the facts about the organization on the table so the 
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American people had a chance to make an informed judgment.112 His largest dispute with the 
League was the idea that the organization would preserve peace by force, as he believed that 
there could be no true peace procured by force.113 In 1924, Senator Borah became the chairman 
of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, giving him a more powerful position to reject the 
attempts to force the United States into the League.114 It was his high position in the Senate, his 
clear distrust of the League, and his determination to find a peace solution that was not founded 
in force that made Senator Borah the perfect ally for Levinson. He would write hundreds of 
letters to convince Senator Borah of the merits of outlawry, and it would prove to be the right 
decision for Levinson's plan. 
Convincing Senator Borah proved no small task. Borah would not promote any peace 
plan that rested on the idea of force, and because of his strong convictions he gained a reputation 
for being against everything, not for anything. 1 15 Even when Levinson had convinced Borah to 
join the fight for outlawry, the senator did not make it easy and would only support the best 
peace plan Levinson had to offer. He wrote to Levinson in 1922, "we ought to put our case so . . 
completely on paper, even at the expense of being a little bit prolix, that it cannot be 
misconstrued or misapplied," and he consistently forced Levinson to redefine his ideas so that 
they were more clear and concise.116 While in that past Borah had been more connected to the 
disarmament movement, he decided that outlawry had its benefits because attacking the war 
system by outlawing warfare was "an incalculable contribution" to international security.117  One 
of the characteristics of his friendship with Borah that Levinson appreciated was that he did 
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challenge him frequently and made him answer hard questions about outlawry. Levinson 
welcomed criticism of his ideas because it caused him to think critically about what he was 
proposing, and in the long run allowed him to profit and build a stronger defense of outlawry.118 
Outside of their outlawry work-and one of the reasons he chose Borah as an ally-Levinson 
respected the senator immensely, writing in 1923, "again it is confirmed to me that there is no 
one at all a match for you in debate in the Senate."1 19  Senator Borah was not always the easiest 
ally to work with, but Levinson wanted him because of his political power and intelligence. 
As Levinson and Borah proposed to bring outlawry to the attention of the United States 
government, Levinson often had to leave the responsibility to Borah who would have to 
introduce outlawry in some form in the Senate. Levinson worked to convince Borah of the 
validity of his views, writing to him in 1923, "let me say that I am not attempting to force my 
amateur political judgement on you and am only hoping that on reflection my views may meet, 
at least to some extent, with your approval."120 He would write several letters to Borah a month, 
sometimes multiple in a week, increasing pressure on Borah to con.tribute to his outlawry 
pamphlet, and bring the issue to the Senate floor. 12 1 In a near constant battle with political 
developments, it seemed that every time Levinson had sufficiently convinced Borah to introduce 
an outlawry resolution, there would be a political reason that the men felt it was not the right 
time. After the failure of setting up an international court through the League-which was 
largely due to manipulations and maneuvers of different nations' diplomats-Levinson felt 
"Borah, who is pretty well worn out, will want to stage his outlawry speech in such an 
1 18 Stoner, 84-85. 
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environment," and it appeared that there was a constant stream of setbacks to outlawry.122 Then 
finally on February 15, 1923 Senator Borah introduced an outlawry resolution for consideration, 
but did not give a speech about outlawry as he had promised Levinson he would. 123 In a letter 
sent the next month, Borah wrote as explanation that there was no opportunity to adequately 
discuss the resolution and that to do so inadequately would be a mistake. 124 It may have taken 
longer than anticipated, an outlawry resolution was finally introduced in the Senate, and 
Levinson knew that he had picked a strong ally in Senator Borah. 
In combination with his desire to work with men in high places, Levinson also believed 
that outlawry was above all a people's movement, so he spent time teaching the world about 
outlawry. As a part of a memo about outlawry, Levinson wrote "the riddance of war will be the 
crystallization of the will of the people into law; hence the indispensable importance of 
worldwide education on this subject" and he would do his part in educating people on 
outlawry.125 On December 9, 1921 Levinson and some associates organized the American 
Committee for the Outlawry of War, a,._committee name he used to publish and disseminate his 
position on the legality of war.126 Levinson explained the purpose of the committee, and the 
outlawry movement, in a pamphlet, 
Our Committee is proposing to educate the world to the proposition that the war 
system, founded upon force and violence, should be supplanted and superseded 
by a judicial system founded upon treaties and codes of law with the institution of 
war abolished and destroyed root and branch. 127 
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After beginning his committee for outlawry, Levinson made a few attempts to raise money, but 
he did not want to take money for fear of interference with his authority over the outlawry 
movement. 128 Despite wanting to keep people from having influence over the movement because 
of financial contributions, Levinson also tried to convince people that outlawry was the only 
solution to the war problem. In an article about Levinson, it reads "he never exhausts this peace 
topic. He never finished importuning his hearers until they are out of earshot. He never wastes an 
opportunity to make a convert," because he recognized the importance of popular support for the 
success of outlawry.129 Levinson used the power of his committee to spread his ideas and reach 
the general public that he would not have been able speak to directly. He understood and deeply 
believed in the power of people as necessary to gaining traction for a worldwide movement. 
It was not just through his committee work that Levinson sought to rally public support 
for and understanding of outlawry. He truly believed that the success of outlawry was founded in 
the average citizen of the world and the desire of non-governmental citizens for a warless world. 
He wrote i_n a letter to Senator Borah in 1923 explaining that, "our whole proposition rest upon 
the major premise that 95% of the civilized people of the world are against the bloody 
institutions of war."130 Levinson also pointed out that it was difficult for public opinion to 
function against war while it was lawful and warranted which put the burden on people to show 
why war was not justi fied. 131 It was in outlawry that people could find proof that war was not 
legitimate or needed internationally. Levinson did not have much faith in the governments of the 
world to look past their own interests and do what was best for the world. In 1921 he wrote, "in 
the end the appeals will have to be made to the peoples of the various countries and through them 
128 Stoner, 109. 
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by new governmental officials or otherwise, to compel the adoption of a policy that amounts to 
the abolition of warfare."132 Levinson only truly counted on nations to be against war when it fit 
a government's self-interest. In similar sentiments, Philip Kerr wrote, "the one vital interest of all 
nations in all parts of the world is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, for war, like a prairie fire, 
is uncontrollable and may spread anywhere."133 Even as Levinson worked toward outlawry 
through an international treaty, he still believed power rested in the population of the signing 
nations, not with the governments. He wrote in 1924 that if a country was slow to sign a treaty to 
outlaw war that "a campaign among their own peoples who of right should decide the matter, as 
they pay the cost of wars in money and blood."134 Levinson understood the importance of 
cultivating relationships with intellectuals in powerful political and social positions, but he 
believed that the strength of outlawry was rooted in the public's aversion to war. 
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Chapter Four 
Chapter Four examines the Kellogg -Briand Pact, the successes and failures of outlawry, 
and the legacy Levinson left behind. The Kellogg -Brian� Pact is arguably the biggest success of 
the outlawry movement a treaty signed by numerous nations agreeing to make war illegal. This 
chapter looks at Levinson's part in creating the Pact and how he felt about the proceedings. Even 
though the Kellogg-Briand Pact was adopted by over 50 nations, it did not prevent World War II, 
so this chapter considers Levinson's reaction to the failure of the outlawry movement and his 
response to the renewal of war in Europe. While World War II would put a near definite end to 
outlawry, Levinson did not lose complete hope. He still thought that people would come back to 
the idea of making war illegitimate and the power remained with popular support. Levinson left 
behind the story of an individual who was so determined to make a difference and introduce the 
premise of a lawful peace that he should not be forgotten. This chapter ends by explaining 
Levinson's legacy and how he changed the world in his peace efforts in outlawry. 
The great victory of the outlawry movement was the passing of the Kellogg -Briand Pact, 
even though the extent to which it might be deemed successful is questionable. Levinson had a 
large part in the creation of the pact and campaigning for the passage of the treaty. Secretary of 
State Frank B. Kellogg asked Levinson to prepare a draft treaty based on his experiences and 
contact with the French Foreign Office, and Levinson made up a draft which he forwarded to 
Kellogg's office. 135 Even more than just writing the draft, Levinson put forth extreme effort 
behind the scenes to get both the United States government and the French government onboard 
for the outlawry treaty. He had to educate Kellogg to the idea of outlawry, convince his 
colleagues that the treaty proposal coming from French diplomat Aristide Briand was not 
135 Ferrell, 100. 
dangerous, and to change the isolationist mindset to many Americans to ones of cooperation and 
support in regard to international relations.136 Briand announced in early 1927 that France was 
ready to conclude an agreement with the United States to outlaw war and settle the differences 
between the two nations with a bilateral treaty. However, Kellogg was not as willing to be tied so 
closely to France, so he suggested that they instead put forward a multilateral treaty all nations 
could adopt, not just the US and France.137 The pact would outlaw war. Negotiations between 
Kellogg and Briand were facilitated by Levinson, and it was not easy work to convince the two 
diplomats to work together towards the goal of outlawry. 
The Kellogg -Briand Pact was the great diplomatic achievement of the outlawry 
movement, and Levinson did his share to make the dream of a multilateral treaty outlawing war a 
reality. In a 1 929 article "A Chicago Lawyer's One -Man War Against War" about Levinson's  
peace work, written by M.W. Childs of the Post -Dispatch Staff, Childs claimed that justice 
would be done if the Kellogg -Briand Pact was called the Levinson pact. The article concluded 
that, "it is this one man who has moved mountains to bring it into being,''..
" 
and many people 
recognized that the pact would not exist without Levinson's help and the foundation of the 
outlawry movement.138 After nearly three months of dodging, Briand, in the name of France, 
finally accepted the principle of a multilateral treaty renouncing war. On the American side of 
negotiations, Kellogg invited Italy, Japan, Germany, and Great Britain to enter the antiwar 
discussion by way of a draft treaty in April 1 927. 139 The Kellogg -Briand Pact renouncing war as 
an instrument of national policy was signed August 27, 1928, by 63 different nations.140 
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Levinson was finally seeing his years of hard work pay off, as the world seemed well on its way 
to signing a multi -national treaty that rejected the legality of war and looked to non -aggressive 
conflict resolution. 
As the world watched the negotiations for the Kellogg -Briand Pact, there was 
international hope that there might finally be an end to war. Levinson saw that the law could be 
powerful and if one could push past diplomatic red tape, that a treaty resulting from outlawry 
would bene fit the world. He thought that the Kellogg -Briand Pact "sounds the death-knell of war 
as an institution, as a method of settling international disputes," and that through it, outlawry had 
found its official home.141 In 1928, Levinson wrote that he hoped the League of Nations would 
approve "the Kellogg treaty and adopting the Outlawry of War as the fundamental as well as the 
ultimate objective of the League," which shows that he believed that the treaty was powerful 
enough to even redeem the League.142 On January 16, 1929 the General Treaty for the 
Renunciations of War-also known as the Paris Peace Pact, the Briand -Kellogg Pact, and the 
Kellogg -Briand Pact-passed the Senate witQ a vote of 85 to 1 after Senator Borah gave it 
vigorous support.143 Regardless of how much work Levinson himself put into the creation of the 
treaty that would become the Kellogg -Briand Pact, he would write in 1928, "we must admit that 
the Kellogg proposal would never have seen the light of day if Briand had not started the ball 
rolling."144 Once the treaty was finalized, it had been initially signed by Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium and "gave a sound diplomatic basis 
for action in each case and gave diplomats con fidence in the support of public opinion."145 While 
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there was widespread excitement at the possibility of the Kellogg -Briand Pact and what it meant 
for the state of war in the world, Levinson would soon find that outlawry would not be able to 
stand up in the world left behind after the Great War. 
Even though Levinson had faith in outlawry and its ability to put an end to war, he also 
understood how WWI had changed the world in way that it may not be ready for outlawry. In a 
letter in 1929 to Levinson, Philip Kerr voiced his concern about the Kellogg-Briand Pact by 
writing, "history seems to show that treaties of this kind, which provide no machinery to ensure 
their own execution, rapidly lose potency over public opinion unless they are implemented in 
some definite way."146 Levinson wrote a letter in 1929 stating, "it is pretty difficult for people 
writhing under the burdens of sixty years of future debts to get enthusiastic on the subject of 
world peace," making it clear that he was aware of the limitations people were put under due to 
World War I and its aftermath.147 He specifically mentioned Germany in a letter in 1923 writing, 
It was a little much to ask defeated Germany to punish its war criminals when no 
la�s against war had ever been enacted, and when the people of Germany 
themselves had been penalized beyond all precedent in history.148 
Even before the Kellogg -Braid Pact was an idea, Levinson was concerned about the effect WWI 
would have on any peace proceedings that were attempted. Levinson was proud of the treaty that 
had come from outlawry, but he did not believe that it was the solution to all of the world's 
problems, especially those resulting from war. 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact and outlawry movement may not have done exactly what 
Levinson envisioned, but the Pact did change aspects of international relations creating a new 
146 Philip Kerr to Salmon Levinson, 19 February 1929, Box 26, Folder 3, Levinson Papers. 
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world system. In a speech Levinson gave in 1939, he said, "a neutral nation has heretofore 
always meant a nation that was not in a war that was being carried on by other nations."149 He 
reflected on the ways that war terms transformed and that being neutral in a war did not mean the 
same thing after World War I. Philip Kerr, ten years earlier in 1929, had written, "the logic of the 
Outlawry of War movement implies the complete disappearance of the old issues of belligerent 
versus neutral rights."150 Levinson had to eventually grapple with the fact that outlawry had not 
erased the idea of belligerent and neutral nations. The changes in the legal rules regarding war 
did not stop states from seizing land-such as Japan taking Manchuria-but possession was no 
longer enough to establish legal rights and other states rejected those seizures as illegitimate.151 
The fact that nations did not necessarily recognize a country' s  authority simply because it had 
invaded a piece of land reaffirmed the break with the past represented by the Pact, even if that 
was not an intended consequence by the framers. 
However, one of the biggest perceived failures of the Kellogg -Briand Pact was that 
making war illegal did not stop the second world war from taking place. Levinson watched as 
Europe seemed to be headed for another global conflict and contemplated what the United States 
role would be in this foreign war. In a speech in 1939, he said "America cannot be deaf, dumb 
and blind to all that goes on in this world" and "there are two ways of getting into war: one is by 
being too brash and the other is by being too cowardly. My country should be neither."152 
Levinson had worked incredibly hard to get a treaty passed outlawing war, then had to watch the 
world return to war and had to reevaluate his stance on war and the morality of respecting the 
treaty to stay out of war. 
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As war neared, it can be difficult to see the successes in Levinson's outlawry movement. 
However, Levinson left behind a legacy of peace and hope for a brighter future free from the 
institution of war. After the signing of the Kellogg-Brain Pact, Levinson wrote that August 27 
should become a World Peace Holiday. Once w ar  was outlawed, he declared, "I don't believe we 
will have any international law -breakers, alias bandit nations, alias aggressor nations," because 
he truly believed in the affect his peace work would have on the world.153 John Haynes Holmes, 
an associate of Levinson's, stated "On this day, each year, so long as civilization endures, let this 
renunciation be solemnly and gratefully renewed, not by statemen but by the peoples 
themselves."154 Although Holmes used August 28, the two men were both thinking of a 
celebration for the Kellogg -Briand Pact. The pact clearly was not successful as Levinson had 
hoped, however, it was still a victory as it was the first time that the nations of the world got 
together and really spoke of the legality of war. The discussion also brought the issue of 
outlawry to the attention of the public and made it a people's movement. Levinson wrote about 
the Pact, "upon these things I base my optimism for the future, once we make the people realize, 
upon the universal ratification of the Pact, that the power is in them."155 Levinson always saw 
incredible strength in the power of the people. Even though WWII would not be far away, 
outlawry did not accomplish nothing: it led to a global revolution where aggressive war can be a 
prosecuted crime in the international court.156 The Kellogg -Briand Pact may not have been able 
to convince the world to stop the use of war, but it did bring the question of legality to people 
and governments who had not previously seen law as a foundation of peace. 
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Levinson may not be a well -known name outside of academia, but he left an impression 
on the people he worked with, and was not easily forgotten. Frank Hayes wrote a letter to 
Levinson in 1928 asking, "would it be proper at this time to tell of your part in conferences with 
Briand and Kellogg, as the direct instigator of such a multilateral treaty?"157 His associates 
wanted him to get the recognition that he deserved for all of the work he did not just in getting 
the Kellogg -Briand Pact signed, but just in the massive amount of effort he put into outlawry. 
When it came time for the Nobel Peace Prize winner to be chosen, both close friends and casual 
acquaintances of Levinson nominated him and joined the drive to get him the prize that they felt 
he rightly deserved. 158 The article "A Chicago Lawyer's One -Man War Against War" praises 
Levinson as a peace prophet and urges that he should receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his 
momentous labor in bringing outlawry to the world.159 Levinson would not end up getting the 
Nobel Peace Prize, as it would go to Kellogg and Briand for their negotiations of the Pact. It was 
not surprising, as it would have been difficult for the Nobel committee to pass over an official 
who was connected with the actual negotiations of the treaty for a private citize� for work on the 
same treaty.160 Levinson was not upset by losing the prize, as he had always preferred to stay out 
of the public light. In a letter to one of the men who had campaigned in Levinson's name, he 
wrote "I feel as if I had received glory enough without competing with Mr. Kellogg who, 
according to precedents, is at least politically entitled to the big reward."161 It was through his 
associates that Levinson felt he had achieved the most, by distilling the idea of peace and 
bringing people over the idea that outlawry could work. 
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In the face of WWII Levinson never lost hope that the world could find its way back to 
pace and that outlawing war was the right first step. If nothing else entered the public's mind and 
consciousness-such as the Code and Court that Levinson worked hard to create and promote-
at the very least the idea of outlawing war became a common idea in America and many other 
parts of the world.162 On his seventieth birthday, the Chicago Sinai Congregation wished 
Levinson a happy birthday and said, 
The world has not yet learned to "outlaw war," as he so ardently desired. His 
immediate contribution, therefore, to our day is a contribution of the history of 
ethics rather than to the history of international relations. The nations of the world 
have, because of him, learned to speak of international relations ethically. 163 
Levinson believed so completely that peace was possible, that he was able to convince others 
that there was a way for a better world to be made. He always claimed it depended on everyone, 
not just governments, to make peace a reality. As he witnessed Europe heading for another 
global conflict, he wrote that the United States sho,_Id stay committed to the Kellogg -Briand Pact 
and not enter into a war if it should come to that. However, he also wrote in 1 928 that the US 
should, 
162 Ferrell, 36. 
Help guide the suffering peoples of the world, including our own, into the path of 
peace, comfort, and contentment. In this way alone can universal peace be 
attained. For the flower of peace cannot grow except in the soil of peace; and the 
world has not cultivated the soil of peace since the Great War. 164 
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He had faith in people and their ability to become better, for the world to grow tired of war and 
begin to understand that an idea such as outlawry could save them from destruction. Levinson 
also knew the limitations of his movement, writing in 1928, "the greatest difficulty we have, 
living as we do in a war-world, filled with war traditions, is to visualize a warless world," but he 
did not let those limitations dishearten him.165 Salmon Levinson never stopped hoping and 
pushing for the day that war would be outlawed and the world could move into a peaceful 
existence governed by laws and the will of the people. 
Salmon Levinson is not a prominent historical figure despite all of the work he did in the 
interwar years aimed towards a lasting peace. He forged relationships with people in important 
and powerful positions, such as creating peace plans with Senator Knox and forming a Senate 
resolution with Senator Borah. Levinson preferred to work behind the scenes, convincing people 
that his peace plan was vital and then letting his associates become advocates for the cause. He 
believed that war, as terrible as it was, should be against the law, and by outlawing it, war would 
lose its legitimacy in in.�emational affairs. Levinson built, reshaped, refined, and promoted his 
idea of Outlawry; a movement that would gamer attention from not only governments, but also 
the public. He had faith in the people of the world being so against war, that it would be the 
population of citizens that pushed for and supported outlawry. Levinson was able to celebrate the 
success of the signing of the Kellogg -Briand Pact that outlawed war, but his happiness would not 
last long. He would then witness the world tum towards war again, and he must have felt deep 
disappointment at the prospect of a second devastating war. However, Levinson never lost hope 
in the people, as he always felt that outlawry had to come from those who actually fought in wars 
and felt the repercussions of such a horrific institution. He would not live to see the end of 
165 Salmon Levinson to Philip Kerr, 3 July 1928, Box 26, Folder 2, Levinson Papers. 
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WWII, so one cannot say how Levinson would have felt about the leaders and peace proceedings 
following the war, in comparison to his own idea. Levinson's Outlawry may have been idealistic, 
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